Stuxnet took the world by storm two years ago.
The worm was different from previous viruses: it wasn't designed
to steal money, identities, or passwords. Instead, the malware targeted the
controls at industrial facilities such as power plants, inspiring talk of a top
secret, government-sponsored cyberwar. At the time of its discovery in June
2010, the assumption was that espionage lay behind the effort, but subsequent
analysis uncovered the ability of the malware to control plant operations
outright--specifically an Iranian nuclear facility. In addition to showing that
a cyber attack could cause significant physical damage to a facility, it also
raised concerns that future malware, modeled after Stuxnet, could target
critical infrastructure, such as power and water-treatment plants in the United
States. "We have entered into a new phase of conflict in which we use a
cyberweapon to create physical destruction, and in this case, physical
destruction in someone else's critical infrastructure.” Hayden, who is a former
head of the National Security Agency and served as CIA director under President
George W. Bush, says he knows more about the attack on Iran than he can
publicly discuss. But he warns that there are potential problems and
consequences that come with this new kind of warfare. "When you use a
physical weapon it destroys itself, in addition to the target, if it's used
properly," Hayden said. "A cyber weapon doesn't, so there are those
out there who can take a look at this, study it and maybe even attempt to turn
it to their own purposes."
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